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False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the
Theory of State Constitutional Law
by EARL M. MALTZ*
Introduction
If one were to choose a patron saint of the revival of interest in state
constitutional law, that title would almost surely belong to Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan of the United States Supreme Court. His article, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,' is the best known
and most widely cited of all recent calls for state court activism.2 Bren-
nan argues that by granting special state constitutional status to interests
and groups that the United States Supreme Court has refused to protect,
state courts vindicate the values of state autonomy that are implicit in the
structure of American federalism.3
This Article contends that the focus on federalism is not appropriate
in state constitutional analysis. Part I examines the structure of Justice
Brennan's argument and concludes that his purported concern for state
autonomy is inconsistent with the structure of the remainder of his juris-
prudence. Parts II and III explore the role federalism plays in state con-
stitutional analysis generally. The Article concludes that considerations
of federalism neither mandate state court activism nor suggest any par-
ticular approach to state constitutional analysis. Thus, Brennan's analy-
sis is unsound and perhaps disingenuous.
I. Justice Brennan and the Concept of Federalism
The rhetoric of federalism dominates Justice Brennan's argument
for state court activism. In his seminal article, Brennan hails such activ-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). This Article is a revised and expanded version
of a paper presented at the conference on "State Constitutions in the Third Century of Ameri-
can Federalism," sponsored by the Center for the Study of Federalism, Philadelphia, March
1987, and forthcoming in The Annals of the American Society of Political and Social Science
(May 1988).
1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
2. See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1540, 1550
(1985) (Brennan's article, supra note 1, is the 19th most-cited law review article).
3. Brennan, supra note I, at 502-04.
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ism as a healthy embodiment of the American principle of state auton-
omy. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim that the newly aggressive posture
of state courts must be applauded by "[e]very believer in our concept of
federalism. ' 4
Although Justice Brennan describes himself as a "devout believer"
in the concept of federalism, his judicial record suggests otherwise. His
opinions for the Court in Fay v. Noia' and Henry v. Mississippi6 clearly
demonstrate that state autonomy generally does not rank highly in his
pantheon of values. Fay involved the question of whether a procedural
default by a criminal defendant in his original state court proceeding
barred inquiry into a constitutional claim in a subsequent federal habeas
corpus action. Brennan conceded that the procedural default constituted
an "adequate and independent state ground" which would have barred
inquiry into the conviction on direct appeal to the Supreme Court.7
Nonetheless, he concluded that the habeas corpus action should proceed,
arguing that "[w]hatever residuum of state interest there may be under
[these] circumstances is manifestly insufficient in the face of the federal
policy.., of affording an effective remedy for restraints contrary to the
Constitution."8
In Fay, the Court explicitly relied on the special characteristics of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus. However, in subsequent cases
Justice Brennan has clearly demonstrated that his views on state auton-
omy are not limited to that context. In Henry v. Mississippi, he relied on
similar principles to restrict state autonomy in the context of direct re-
view of a state court judgment. The case arose from a Mississippi crimi-
nal trial in which the trial court admitted the testimony of a police officer
as competent evidence. Mississippi law required contemporaneous objec-
tion to the admission of illegal evidence. Defense counsel had not made a
contemporaneous objection at trial, choosing to move instead for a di-
rected verdict at the close of the state's case. The record was unclear on
the question of whether the failure to object was tactical or the result of
error. Writing for the majority, Brennan conceded that the contempora-
neous objection rule served a legitimate state interest in procedural or-
der.9 Nonetheless, he concluded that in the absence of a conscious
waiver of the right to object, a federal constitutional claim could not be
4. Id. at 502.
5. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
6. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
7. Fay, 372 U.S. at 428-29.
8. Id. at 433-34.
9. "The Mississippi Rule requiring contemporaneous objection of illegal evidence clearly
does serve a legitimate state interest." Henry, 379 U.S. at 448.
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foreclosed as long as this state interest had been "substantially served" by
a motion for directed verdict that challenged the allegedly inadmissible
testimony. '° Thus, Brennan once again restricted the ability of states to
enforce concededly rational procedural rules enacted for the governance
of the states' own court systems.
Justice Brennan's attitude toward state autonomy is not limited to
his analysis of the relationship between state courts and federal courts.
The beliefs he evinced in Fay and Henry carry over to his approach to
defining substantive rights. His dissent in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez" illustrates this point. Rodriguez presented
a fourteenth amendment challenge to the school financing system of
Texas. Rejecting the challenge, the majority opinion relied heavily on
federalism concerns:
[This case is] nothing less than a direct attack on the way in
which Texas has chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax
revenues.... [A]ppellees would have the Court intrude in an area
in which it has traditionally deferred to state legislatures....
[T]his case also involves the most persistent and difficult ques-
tions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack
of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against prema-
ture interference with the informed judgments made at the state
and local levels. Education ... presents a myriad of 'intractable
economic, social, and even philosophical problems.' . . . In such
circumstances, the judiciary is well advised to refrain from impos-
ing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that could cir-
cumscribe or handicap [their] continued research and
experimentation .... "
Justice Brennan did not accept the majority's federalism arguments.
In fact, he totally ignored them, implying that such concerns were triv-
ial. I3 Instead, he would have applied a strict scrutiny standard of review
to education financing schemes,1 4 resulting in the precise "inflexible re-
straints" on state-centered choices that the majority sought to avoid.
Justice Brennan's attitude toward state autonomy consistently col-
ors his approach to other federalism-related issues as well. For example,
he has been one of the most persistent critics of attempts to extend the
doctrine of Younger v. Harris5 beyond the narrowest holding that, ab-
sent a showing of bad faith harassment by the prosecution, federal courts
10. Id.
11. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Id. at 40-43 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 63 (Brennan J., dissenting).
15. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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generally may not enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. 6 Similarly, he has
rejected claims that considerations of state autonomy should limit federal
control over state governmental functions. 7 He has also argued that the
dormant Commerce Clause forbids states from providing certain benefits
only to their respective citizenries. 18
Given the minimal importance of state autonomy as a value in his
decisions, Justice Brennan's appeal to the concept of federalism must re-
flect a belief that state court activism will advance some other set of val-
ues. In fact, even a casual reading of State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights 11 reveals his true agenda. With some jus-
tification, Brennan fears that the emerging Burger (now Rehnquist)
Court majority will erode many of the important principles of individual
liberty established by the Warren Court. He views the state courts as a
medium by which these principles can be preserved and expanded. Not-
ing that a majority of the Burger Court has often cited principles of fed-
eralism as a justification for restrictive readings of the Federal
Constitution, Brennan argues:
[T]he very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies con-
stitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With the
federal locus of our double protections weakened, our liberties can-
not survive if the states betray the trust the Court has put in them.
And if that trust is, for the Court, strong enough to override the
risk that some states may not live up to it, how much more
strongly should we trust state courts whose manifest purpose is to
expand constitutional protections. With federal scrutiny dimin-
ished, state courts must respond by increasing their own.z"
Brennan's primary message thus becomes clear: state courts should
vindicate personal liberties along the lines undertaken by the Warren
Court by reading their state constitutions expansively and should justify
their actions by referring to the "neutral" principle of federalism.
Brennan makes the point even more plainly in his most recent elabo-
ration of his views on the role of state constitutions in the federal sys-
16. E.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 450 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 613 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985) (overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)); National League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. South Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 101 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (Justices Bren-
nan, White, and Stevens joined in the dissent); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 817-19 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. See supra note 1.
20. Brennan, supra note 1, at 503.
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tern.21 Noting that many commentators have raised federalism-based
objections to the application of the Bill of Rights to the states, he argues
that "[a] healthy federalism is not promoted by allowing state officials to
violate provisions of the Bill of Rights."22 On the other hand, he ap-
plauds the fact that "the state courts have responded with marvelous
enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional
gaps left by decisions of the Supreme Court majority" 23-- decisions from
which Brennan has often dissented. In short, Brennan apparently defines
"healthy" federalism as a system which enforces the values with which
he agrees.
Of course, by appealing to the concept of federalism to justify state
court activism, Brennan theoretically leaves open the possibility that
state courts will be activist in support of conservative as well as liberal
causes. And indeed, occasionally one can identify state constitutional
decisions that advance values generally associated with the conservative
movement.24 A number of factors, however, virtually guarantee that
state court activism will have an overwhelmingly liberal impact.
First, state courts must comply with the Supremacy Clause.25 Fed-
eral law, especially constitutional precedent, provides standards against
which state constitutional guarantees must be measured.26 While per-
haps not as extensive as some would like, these federal standards are
constructed primarily of values associated with the liberal wing of Amer-
ican politics.27 Thus, the potential danger that conservative state judi-
21. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
22. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 549.
24. See Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation Under State Constitu-
tions: The Case for Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241 (1981), reprinted in DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94 (B. McGraw ed. 1985) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT].
25. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
26. See Swindler, Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal Floor and State
Ceiling, 49 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1984); Development in the Law: The Interpretation of State Consti-
tutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1358 (1982); Part III, infra.
27. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (overturning a Texas statute outlawing
abortion except when necessary to save the life of the mother); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (requiring the police to warn defendants of their fifth and sixth amendment rights
when the defendants are in custody); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding the Fourth
Amendment's regulation of searches and seizures applicable to the states through the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause).
There are exceptions. See e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)
(holding that the school board's policy of extending preferential protection against layoffs
based on race violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,
438 U.S. 234 (1978) (holding that a Minnesota law, which essentially increased the financial
obligations of companies with pension plans no longer operating in that state, violated the
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ciaries will, through judicial activism, erode the values Justice Brennan
seeks to advance is substantially limited.
Furthermore, contemporary political ideology virtually guarantees
that state court activism primarily will favor liberal causes. American
conservatism has become associated generally with the concept of judi-
cial restraint. This phenomenon-a reversal of the situation in the
Roosevelt era-is no doubt in part a reaction to the aggressive liberalism
of Warren Court activism, which consistently cast the judiciary as one of
the most powerful enemies of conservatism. It is reinforced by the fact
that judicial intervention against measures which restrict the free enter-
prise system (and are thus antithetical to conservatives) is quite clearly
akin to "Lochnering", 28 which virtually all law students are taught is the
cardinal sin of constitutional decisionmaking. Thus, both state court ad-
herence to federal precedent and current political thought make it likely
that a judge of conservative orientation will express that orientation
through judicial restraint rather than conservative activism.
In short, the appeal to federalism provides Justice Brennan and
other advocates of Warren Court values with a relatively risk-free device
to broaden the appeal of their call for state court activism in support of
their agenda. Of course, this observation does not automatically con-
demn such use of federalism as unsound. Whatever their origins, the
arguments based on these concepts must stand or fall on their own mer-
its. Indeed, other commentators are plainly interested in state autonomy
for its own sake.2 9 The remainder of this paper will explore the fallacies
underlying many appeals to federalism in state constitutional analysis.
II. Federalism and the Models of State Constitutional
Adjudication
On one level, issues of state constitutional law plainly implicate
questions of federalism. After all, state constitutional law becomes
prominent only when state courts establish principles which diverge from
Contract Clause); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (drawing a distinction between cam-
paign contributions and expenditures and holding that speech interests in the former are mini-
mal and may be limited to reduce the chance of political corruption).
28. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner held that a New York statute
regulating the hours of labor under an employment contract was unconstitutional. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that "the freedom of master and employee to contract with each other in
relation to their employment .... cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 64.
29. See, e.g., Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv.
165 (1984) [hereinafter Linde, E. Pluribus]; Linde, First Things First- Rediscovering the States'
Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980) [hereinafter Linde, First Things First].
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the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution. On its
face, such divergence seems to raise important issues of federal-state rela-
tions. Moreover, the answer to one key question-whether a state court
has the power to interpret the state constitution differently from its fed-
eral counterpart-is plainly controlled by considerations of federalism.
The power of state courts to interpret their own constitutions, how-
ever, is not only fundamental but uncontroversial. All agree that the
Federal Constitution in no way constrains state courts in interpreting
their local constitutions; that the federal Supreme Court has no power to
force state courts to alter these interpretations; and that in the event of an
irreconcilable conflict between state constitutional law and federal law,
state courts must follow federal law. Discussions of federalism thus fig-
ure most prominently in comparisons of the competing approaches to
state constitutional adjudication. Three basic models of assessing the re-
lationship between federal constitutional law and state constitutional law
have emerged: (1) the pure independent model, (2) the lockstep model,
and (3) the reactive/independent model.
A. The Pure Independent Approach
Courts adopting the pure independent position view state constitu-
tional law as entirely distinct from its federal counterpart. Thus, they
argue that constitutional pronouncements by the United States Supreme
Court are entitled to no greater respect in state constitutional adjudica-
tion than those of any other court. In states where this position prevails,
courts conduct an entirely independent analysis of each issue before them
to determine the proper reach of state constitutional law.
The opinions of these courts follow two basic patterns. Some courts,
following Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans A. Linde's suggestion of
"putting first things first," hardly even refer to United States Supreme
Court opinions in their state constitutional analysis.3" The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court adopted this methodology in State v. Ball.3 1 Ball
concerned the sufficiency of cause to believe that a cigarette, observed by
a police officer in a traffic stop, contained contraband. Analogous federal
law suggested that the search was permissible.32 Mentioning this view
only in passing, 3 the Ball court held that the state constitution required
30. See Linde, First Things First, supra note 29, at 387.
31. 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983).
32. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
33. "We note that the United States Supreme Court has recently spoken on the probable
cause requirement of the plain view doctrine.... Although that decision is binding as a matter
of federal constitutional law, we choose not to follow it in interpreting our State Constitution."
125 N.H. at 235, 471 A.2d at 353 (citing Texas v. Brown).
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probable cause before a police seizure and that the officer had no prob-
able cause to seize what turned out to be a marijuana cigarette. Thus, the
court ruled that the cigarette was inadmissible.
By contrast, other courts adopting the pure independent approach
examine the views of the United States Supreme Court in greater detail.
The Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in People v. Sporleder34 is typi-
cal. Sporleder involved the admissibility of evidence obtained through
the use of a pen register.35 The issue was whether the police were re-
quired to obtain a search warrant prior to installing the device.
The Colorado Supreme Court first looked to Smith v. Maryland,36 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that because telephone
users voluntarily convey the numbers they dial to the telephone com-
pany, users have no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in those num-
bers.37 Therefore, the use of a pen register did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the evidence in Smith
was ruled admissible.
In Sporleder, the Colorado court summarized the reasoning of the
majority in Smith and conceded that the relevant state constitutional
provision was "substantially similar' 39 to the Fourth Amendment.
Nonetheless, obviously persuaded by the dissent in Smith," the Colorado
court found that "the defendant's expectation that the numbers dialed
would remain free from government intrusion is a reasonable one," and
therefore ruled that a warrant was necessary as a matter of state law.4 1
On this basis, the court held the evidence was inadmissible.
Of course, the mere fact that a state court has adopted the pure
independent approach does not imply that it will automatically deviate
from federal constitutional precedent. The action of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Arrington 42 illustrates this point. In Arrington,
the court was required to decide whether affidavits based on informant
34. 666 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1983).
35. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone
by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released ......
Id. at 137.
36. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
37. Id. at 742, 745.
38. Id. at 746.
39. 666 P.2d at 140.
40. Id. at 140-41 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). In his dis-
sent in Smith, Justice Marshall argued that "It]hose who disclose certain facts to a bank or
phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be
released to other persons for other purposes."
41. 666 P.2d at 144.
42. 311 N.C. 633, 319 S.E.2d 254 (1984).
[Vol. 15:429
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hearsay constituted sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of a
search warrant.
The United States Supreme Court had wrestled with the same ques-
tion in Illinois v. Gates43 when it rejected the analysis of Aguilar v.
Texas' and Spinelli v. United States.45 Under the Aguilar-Spinelli rule,
affidavits were required both to reveal the basis for the knowledge of the
informant and to provide facts establishing the reliability of the inform-
ant. By contrast, in Gates, the Court adopted an analysis which empha-
sized the "totality of the circumstances. 46
As an initial matter, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the
notion that it was bound by the holdings of the Supreme Court in resolv-
ing state constitutional claims: "[w]hether rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of North Carolina have been provided and the proper tests to be
used in resolving such issues are questions which can only be answered
with finality by this Court."'47 Proceeding to the constitutional claim, the
court noted that prior North Carolina decisions had approved the two-
pronged Aguilar-Spinelli analysis.48 Nonetheless, finding the Gates rea-
soning "compelling", the court in Arrington adopted the totality of the
circumstances analysis.49
Arrington demonstrates that courts advocating the pure independent
approach may still conclude that the relevant state constitutional protec-
tions are coterminous with their federal counterparts. Taken together
with Sporleder, it illustrates that state courts applying the pure independ-
ent approach are distinguishable by the methodology they employ rather
than the results they reach.
B. The "Lockstep" Approach
At the other end of the spectrum from the pure independents are
those state courts adopting the so-called "lockstep" approach to state
constitutional adjudication. Courts employing this analysis begin with
the premise that state constitutional provisions provide precisely the
same level of protection as analogous federal constitutional guarantees.
Under the lockstep formulation, changes or clarifications of federal law
43. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
44. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
45. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
46. 462 U.S. at 230.
47. Arrington, 311 N.C. at 643, 319 S.E.2d at 260.
48. Id. at 637, 319 S.E.2d at 257 (citing State v. Hayes, 291 N.C. 293, 230 S.E.2d 146
(1976); State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972)).
49. Id. at 643, 319 S.E.2d at 260.
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by the United States Supreme Court lead to parallel changes in state con-
stitutional law.
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jackson 50 engen-
dered a heated dispute over the desirability of adopting the lockstep ap-
proach. Jackson began as a prosecution for drunk driving; at issue was
the admissibility into evidence of the defendant's refusal to take a
Breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. The defendant claimed his act
of refusal was testimonial, and therefore subject to his right against self-
incrimination-a right guaranteed by both the federal and state
constitutions.
Initially, the Montana Supreme Court ruled four to three that the
evidence was inadmissible. 1 Although the majority based its ruling on
both the federal and state constitutions, it did not specifically address the
question of whether the protection against self-incrimination secured by
the state constitution might differ from federal law. In its discussion of
the state provision, however, the majority relied only on federal cases to
support its conclusion.5 2 The dissenters contended that Montana had
previously adopted the lockstep approach to self-incrimination issues and
that federal constitutional law did not bar the use of the evidence. 3
The state petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. Prior to disposition of the writ, the Court held in South Da-
kota v. Neville 54 that admission of the type of evidence at issue in Jackson
did not violate any federal constitutional norms. The Court then vacated
Jackson and remanded the case for further consideration in light of
Neville.55
On remand, the Montana Supreme Court reversed itself by a five-to-
50. 195 Mont. 185, 637 P.2d 1 (1981), vacated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1030, rev'd, 206
Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983).
51. Id. at 193, 637 P.2d at 5.
52. Id. at 191-93, 637 P.2d at 4-5 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)). The majority did cite one
Montana case, State v. Finley, 173 Mont. 162, 566 P.2d 1119 (1977), for the purpose of distin-
guishing it from Jackson.
53. 195 Mont. at 193, 637 P.2d at 4 (Haswell, C.J., dissenting).
54. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
55. 460 U.S. 1030 (1983). This action clearly presaged the adoption of the much-
maligned rule of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Under this rule,
when... a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to
be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did
because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
Id. at 1040-41.
[Vol. 15:429
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two margin.56 All members of the new majority firmly embraced the
lockstep approach to self-incrimination issues, concluding that in this
area of law, "[t]he Montana constitutional guaranty affords no greater
protection than that of the Federal constitution. '5 7  This conclusion
brought a bitter dissent from Justice Shea, the author of the original ma-
jority opinion. He asserted that "the majority has abdicated [its] respon-
sibility by... permit[ting] the United States Supreme Court to tell us
what our state constitution means."58
C. The Reactive/Independent Approach
Some judges and commentators have advocated an intermediate ap-
proach, which perhaps can best be described as a "reactive/independent"
analysis. Under a reactive/independent analysis, authoritative interpre-
tations of federal constitutional law presumptively control the state
court's analysis of analogous state constitutional issues. However, the
state court will adopt a different analysis if justified by special
circumstances.5 9
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Handler's concurring opinion in
State v. Hunt' ° clearly illustrates this method of analysis. Like
Sporleder,61 Hunt dealt with the admissibility of evidence obtained
through the use of a pen register. Handler began his argument by assert-
ing that, while not formally controlling state constitutional adjudication,
"[t]he opinions of the Supreme Court ...are nevertheless important
guides on the subjects which they squarely address."62 Handler then set
out seven factors that, in his view, would justify the imposition of more
56. 206 Mont. 338, 672 P.2d 255 (1983).
In part, the decision was a vindication of the Long approach to the relationship between
the federal courts and state supreme courts. See supra note 55. Justice Morrison, whose vote
was essential to the original decision, averred explicitly that he had originally voted to suppress
only because he had misunderstood the applicable federal law, which was later authoritatively
construed in Neville. 206 Mont. at 349, 672 P.2d at 260 (Morrison, J., concurring). Thus,
review by the Supreme Court had served its proper function-correction of state court mis-
takes in the application of a federal standard.
57. 206 Mont. at 348, 672 P.2d at 260 (quoting State v. Armstrong, 170 Mont. 256, 260,
552 P.2d 616, 619 (1976)).
58. Id. at 358, 672 P.2d at 262 (Shea, J., dissenting).
59. For examples of advocacy of such an approach, see Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail
and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
975, 986-96 (1979); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State
Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 318-19 (1977).
60. 91 N.J. 338, 358-72, 450 A.2d 952, 962-69 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
61. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
62. Hunt, 91 N.J. at 363, 450 A.2d at 964 (Handler, J., concurring).
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stringent state constitutional guidelines. 63 Handler concurred in holding
the evidence inadmissible as a matter of state law, concluding that "New
Jersey's long history of statutory and legal protection for telephonic com-
munications makes independent resort to the State charter appropriate in
the face of conflicting federal law." 6
Advocates of the pure independent approach have attacked both the
reactive/independent and lockstep approaches as inconsistent with basic
premises of federalism.65 Their criticisms of the lockstep analysis have
been particularly strident. Professor Williams has charged that the lock-
step approach "constitutes an unwarranted delegation of state power to
the Supreme Court and a resultant abdication of state judicial responsi-
bility."66 Similarly, Professor K.L. Collins accused the second Jackson
majority of "the abdication of an obligation duly imposed on state judges
to be the final arbiters of state law."67 In essence, these and other critics
claim that the pure independent approach is a necessary corollary of the
theory that each state is a sovereign entity.
To understand the flaw in this argument, one must first analyze the
relationship between state court activism and the concept of state auton-
omy. A minority of commentators seem to believe that such activism per
se advances the values of federalism. As already noted, for example, Jus-
tice Brennan claimed that "[e]very believer in our concept of federalism
... must salute this development [of an increasingly activist posture] in
our state courts."6 Similarly, Professor Wilkes has described state court
protection of rights not protected by federal law as "a cornerstone of
federalism."'69 This argument necessarily rests on the premise that a re-
fusal by a state court to be activist somehow diminishes state autonomy.
The difficulty with this argument is that the premise reflects a funda-
mental confusion between the power to choose whether to be activist and
the decision to be activist. Plainly, principles of state autonomy guaran-
63. These conditions include: (1) textual language; (2) legislative history; (3) preexisting
state law; (4) structural differences; (5) matters of particular state interest and local concern;
(6) state traditions; and (7) public attitudes. Id. at 364-67, 450 A.2d at 965-67 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
64. Id. at 368, 450 A.2d at 967 (Handler, 3., concurring).
65. E.g., Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5-9 (1981).
66. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme
Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C.L. REV. 353, 404 (1984).
67. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-The Montana Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV
1095, 1137 (1985).
68. Brennan, supra note 1, at 502.
69. Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoeni
reprinted in DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 166, 183.
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tee to state courts the right to adopt any rule of law not inconsistent with
federal law. In exercising this choice, however, a state court may decline
to take an activist position for a variety of reasons. The state court may
be persuaded by the reasoning of the Supreme Court on the issue; it may
believe that the state constitution provides less protection than the fed-
eral constitution; or it may even believe that the state constitution does
not address the issue at all. In each of these cases, the state court is in
fact obliged to apply the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court. This
obligation does not imply, however, that the state court has abdicated its
responsibility for state constitutional interpretation. Instead, the obliga-
tion is derived from the Supremacy Clause, which binds the state court to
honor applicable federal law.70
Once the distinction between the power to be an activist court and
the decision to exercise this power is understood, it becomes clear that
state court activism in and of itself does not advance the cause of federal-
ism. Federalism is concerned with the allocation of authority between
the state and federal governments. Thus, considerations of federalism are
important when the United States Supreme Court reviews state legisla-
tion. The question in such cases is whether a state can retain its locally
established rule or whether that rule must yield to a paramount national
principle. By contrast, state court review under the state constitution
raises no such issues. The only question is whether the controlling rule
will be that established by the legislature or the court. In either case, the
relevant decision will be made at the state level.
The case law dealing with the right of shopping center owners to
prohibit political speech on their property illustrates this point. Initially,
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc.," the United States Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal
constitutional law, shopping centers were the equivalent of city sidewalks
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court concluded
that the shopping centers could not prohibit speech protected by the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, overruled Logan Val-
ley in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner72 and Hudgens v. NLRB,73 which held that
shopping centers were not subject to the limits of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments.74
70. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
71. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
72. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
73. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
74. Lloyd Corp. effectively limited Logan Valley to its facts. The Court actually overruled
Logan Valley in Hudgens, but stated that, for practical purposes, Logan Valley had already
been overruled by Lloyd Corp. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 517-18.
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Forced to confront their own state constitutions on this issue, state
courts split after the Lloyd and Hudgens decisions.7 5 The California
Supreme Court led those courts that essentially reinstated Logan Valley
as a matter of state law. After initially adopting the reasoning of Lloyd
in Diamond v. Bland,7 6 the California court held in Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center" that the state constitution protected speech and peti-
tioning at shopping centers. The Pruneyard court argued that
"[s]hopping centers to which the public is invited can provide an essen-
tial and invaluable forum for exercising .. .rights [of free speech and
petition]."78 The shopping center owners appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the California ruling amounted
to a taking of property without compensation in violation of the Federal
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected
this contention.79
Faced with an analogous problem, the Connecticut Supreme Court
declined to follow the California precedent. Like its California counter-
part, the provisions of the Connecticut Constitution guaranteeing the
right of free speech do not contain any explicit state action limitations.80
Nonetheless, in Westfarms Associates v. Cologne,8" the state supreme
court held that Connecticut shopping centers need not allow political
speech on their premises, concluding that the state constitutional provi-
sion limited only the actions of the state.82
In assessing the impact of the various shopping center cases on fed-
eralism concerns, one must distinguish sharply between the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and those of the state courts. Each of
the federal constitutional decisions raised important issues of state auton-
omy: Logan Valley imposed a federal standard which overrode any con-
trary state law, while Lloyd, Hudgens, and the federal decision in
Pruneyard established the proposition that states were free of federal con-
stitutional constraints and thus could take any position they pleased on
state constitutional free speech protection. By contrast, neither the ac-
75. For a comprehensive discussion of the positions of the state courts on this issue, see
Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right ofAccess to Private Property Under State Constitu-
tional Law, reprinted in DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 51.
76. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 335, 521 P.2d 460, 463, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1974).
77. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-11, 592 P.2d 341, 346-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-61 (1979), aff'd,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
78. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
79. 447 U.S. 74, 80-85 (1980).
80. CONN. CONsT. art. I, §§ 4, 5, 14; compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3; art. II, §§ 8, 9, 13;
art. III, § 1.
81. 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984).
82. Id. at 64-66, 469 A.2d at 1208-10.
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tivist California decision in Pruneyard nor the nonactivist decision in
Westfarms Associates implicated any federalism concerns. In California,
the relevant rule was established by judicial action and this result could
not be overridden through the normal legislative process. In Connecti-
cut, by contrast, the court held that the action of the legislature would be
binding. In each case, it is clear that the ultimate decision was to be
made at the state level; the only difference involved the question of which
state governmental body should have the final word.
Once the link between the concepts of federalism and state court
activism is broken, lockstep analysis emerges in quite a different light.
Basically, the decision by a state court to follow the lockstep approach
for resolving state constitutional claims reflects the view that there is no
need for additional judicial review when some judicial review exists al-
ready at the federal level. Such a decision does not enhance federal
power in any respect; instead, it simply takes account of an unalterable
reality-the existence of federal judicial review-in determining the allo-
cation of authority among state governing bodies. As Pruneyard and
Westfarms Associates exemplify, state court decisions reflect choices be-
tween state judicial power and state legislative power, rather than be-
tween federal judicial power and state judicial power. State courts
employing the lockstep analysis simply choose to allocate maximum
power to their state legislatures.
In short, the substance of lockstep analysis is entirely consistent
with the basic concept of state autonomy. Of course, one still can attack
the standard verbal formulations of the lockstep approach, which seem
to suggest that United States Supreme Court decisions somehow create
state constitutional law. For lockstep courts, however, these flaws in ar-
ticulation have little impact on the practical results reached.
By contrast, analogous difficulties create very real federalism
problems for state courts taking other approaches. These difficulties arise
when federal constitutional decisions are taken as a floor in state consti-
tutional adjudication. The remainder of this Article explores the
problems this description has created for some state courts.
III. The Problem of the False Floor
The image of federal constitutional law as a "floor" in state court
litigation pervades most commentary on state constitutional law. Com-
mentators contend that in adjudicating cases, state judges must not adopt
state constitutional rules which fall below this floor; courts may, how-
ever, appeal to the relevant state constitution to establish a higher "6eil-
ing" of rights for individuals. Elsewhere I have argued that the entire
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idea that courts can somehow add to the total volume of rights available
to members of society is faced with insuperable analytic difficulties.83
Even leaving these difficulties aside, however, the concept of the federal
floor must be carefully circumscribed.
Certainly, as a matter of federal law, state courts are bound not to
apply any rule which is inconsistent with decisions of the Supreme Court;
the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution84 clearly embodies this
mandate. It would be a mistake, however, to view federal law as a floor
for state constitutional analysis; principles of federalism prohibit the
Supreme Court from dictating the content of state law. In other words,
state courts are not required to incorporate federally-created principles
into their state constitutional analysis; the only requirement is that in the
event of an irreconcilable conflict between federal law and state law prin-
ciples, the federal principles must prevail.
This distinction creates no problems for those courts which follow
lockstep analysis. As already noted, this approach rests on the conclu-
sion that state-law-based judicial activism is simply inappropriate in the
area under consideration. Thus the state court need not speculate on
what rights would be guaranteed if such activism were appropriate.
State courts following either the pure independent model or the re-
active/independent model are faced with far more difficult problems.
Unlike lockstep courts, pure independent or reactive/independent judi-
ciaries cannot claim to be deferring to the state legislature except when
forbidden to do so by operation of the Supremacy Clause. Instead, such
courts must undertake an independent determination of the merits of
each claim based solely on principles of state constitutional law. If the
state court begins its analysis with the view that the federal practice es-
tablishes a "floor", the state court is allowing a federal governmental
body-the United States Supreme Court-to define, at least in part,
rights guaranteed by the state constitution. Thus, to avoid conflict with
fundamental principles of state autonomy, a state court deciding whether
to expand federally recognized rights as a matter of state law must em-
ploy a two-stage process. The court first must determine whether the
federally recognized rights themselves are incorporated in the state con-
stitution and only then must determine whether those protections are
more expansive under state law."
The plurality opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court in State v.
83. Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995, 1007-11 (1985).
84. See supra note 25.
85. See Bator, The State Court and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 605, 605 n.1 (1981).
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Smith 86 exemplifies proper state court methodology. In Smith, two dep-
uty sheriffs discovered the defendant when responding to a report of a
vehicle off the road. Prior to being arrested or receiving Miranda warn-
ings, the defendant admitted that he had been drinking but denied own-
ing the disabled vehicle. After a dispatcher informed the sheriffs that the
defendant did indeed own the vehicle, the defendant admitted ownership.
The defendant was then arrested for driving under the influence of intox-
icants and was given his Miranda warnings.87
The issue in Smith was whether the defendant's prewarning state-
ments were admissible as evidence against him. Under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Berkemer v. McCarty,88 federal law did not bar admis-
sion of the statements. Thus, the defendant was constrained to argue
that Oregon's constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination pre-
vented the use of the statements against him.
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the claim. After an extensive
review of relevant state precedents, Justice J.R. Campbell concluded that
state law permitted all "voluntary confessions" to be admitted.89 The
fact that the defendant incriminated himself prior to receiving Miranda
warnings thus became irrelevant. Since the confession had plainly been
voluntary, it could be used against him in court.90
The Smith result shocked some of those who, up to that time, had
been strong supporters of independent state court analysis. Professor
Ronald K.L. Collins, for example, characterized the decision as "one of
the most devastating blows to state constitutional law."91 Yet the Smith
opinion merely adopted an approach which reflects the fact that the
United States Supreme Court cannot determine the content of state law.
The mere fact that the Miranda rule can be derived from the Federal
Constitution does not imply that the same rule is built into the Oregon
Constitution. Instead, the status of Miranda under state law must be
determined independently. Justice Campbell's opinion reflects such an
analysis; he examined the historical development of Oregon law and de-
termined that the federal rule was inconsistent with established state
practice. Thus, he rejected the federal approach in favor of a different
theory.
The Smith plurality also demonstrated a commendable sensitivity to
the circumstances in which state courts develop their jurisprudence. The
86. 301 Or. 681, 725 P.2d 894 (1986).
87. Id. at 681, 725 P.2d at 895.
88. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
89. 301 Or. at 700, 725 P.2d at 906.
90. Id.
91. Oregon Court Rejects Miranda Approach, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 10, col. 1.
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opinion suggested that in the absence of a widely applicable federal rule,
a different state approach might appropriately be fashioned. 92 This ob-
servation reflected Justice Campbell's recognition that state constitu-
tional law does not exist in a vacuum; instead, state courts must be aware
of the context in which they operate. An important part of this context
is the existence of a body of federal constitutional law which state courts
are powerless to change. In reaching their decisions, state courts quite
properly take the existence of this body of law into account. They can-
not, however, allow federal courts to dictate the content of state constitu-
tional doctrine. In short, however one views the precise result in Smith,
one should admire Justice Campbell's understanding of the basic meth-
odology underlying pure independent analysis.
Unfortunately, the general performance of state courts in analyzing
search and seizure problems has not risen to the same level of excellence.
Prior to the establishment of the federal exclusionary rule in Mapp v.
Ohio,9 3 state courts were free to consider or exclude evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Exercising this discretion, many
states expressly held that, as a matter of state law, the exclusionary rule
did not apply in state criminal prosecutions.94 Mapp changed the rule,
holding that evidence seized in violation of the federal Constitution could
not be used in any criminal prosecution. In recent years, the Supreme
Court has limited the scope of the Mapp requirements.9 5 Not surpris-
ingly, criminal defendants often argue in state court for a broader read-
ing of search and seizure protections as a matter of state constitutional
law.
These arguments necessarily involve two related but analytically dis-
tinct claims. The first claim is that, as a matter of state law, the evidence
was seized illegally. The second claim is that state law requires that ille-
gally seized evidence be excluded at trial. Given the divergence of state
law prior to Mapp and the general controversy surrounding the exclu-
sionary rule itself, one would expect both extensive discussion of the lat-
ter issue and substantial disagreement among state courts regarding the
appropriate conclusion.
In fact, post-Mapp state courts have paid virtually no attention to
the question of whether state law bars the admission of illegally seized
92. 301 Or. at 701, 725 P.2d at 906.
93. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
94. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (1960) (providing a state-by-state
review of the exclusionary rule).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (illegally seized evidence may
be used for impeachment purposes); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand
jury witness may not invoke exclusionary rule).
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evidence. Instead, courts generally have assumed without discussion that
the exclusionary rule should be applied to state constitutional violations
as well as their federal counterparts. Even state courts that prior to
Mapp had refused to adopt the exclusionary rule seem to believe that the
Mapp holding also requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
state law. 96 As a result, some of these courts have extended the exclu-
sionary rule beyond the requirements of federal law.97
The recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision in State v. Novem-
brino98 provides a dramatic example of this phenomenon. In Novem-
brino, the defendant challenged the use of evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant found to have been issued without probable cause. Despite the
defect, the court concluded that the police had acted on the good faith
belief that the warrant was valid. Under similar circumstances, the
United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Leon 99 that exclu-
sion was not required as a matter of federal law. The question before the
New Jersey court was whether the evidence should be excluded as a mat-
ter of state law.
One difficulty with the defendant's argument was that prior to Mapp
the New Jersey courts had consistently held that state law did not em-
brace the exclusionary rule."°° Indeed, the 1947 state constitutional con-
vention had rejected an attempt to write the exclusionary rule into the
state constitution. 10' Hostility to the principle underlying the rule was
not the s6le motive for its rejection; some delegates were simply reluctant
to bind state courts to any position on the subject."2 Nonetheless, it is
fair to say that, prior to 1960, all indications in New Jersey bespoke an
opposition to the exclusionary rule.
Despite this earlier opposition, the court in Novembrino held that
the trial court properly suppressed the evidence.10 3 The court argued
that creation of a good faith exception "will ultimately reduce respect for
96. See, eg., Wilson v. People, 156 Colo. 243, 247-50, 398 P.2d 35, 37-39 (1965); State v.
Wood, 457 So. 2d 206, (La. Ct. App. 1984).
97. See, eg., State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I. 1980) (warrantless search of car four
hours after impoundment violated search and seizure clause of state constitution); State v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (on remand from United States Supreme Court,
South Dakota Supreme Court held that inventory search of car impounded for parking viola-
tion was an unreasonable search under state constitution).
98. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
99. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
100. E.g., Eleuteri v. Richman, 26 N.J. 506, 141 A.2d 46, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958);
State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
101. See Eleuteri, 26 N.J. at 511, 141 A.2d at 49.
102. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 147, 519 A.2d at 850-51.
103. Id. at 157-58, 519 A.2d at 856-57.
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and compliance with the probable cause standard.. .. ." Justice Gary
S. Stein, writing for the majority, cited a number of cases to refute the
dissent's claim that "New Jersey has no historical attachment to the ex-
clusionary rule."1I" However, Stein principally relied on State v. Valen-
tin,'0 6 which he read to have "imbedded [the exclusionary rule] in our
jurisprudence. ' '1O7
Obviously, there is nothing untoward about a state court holding
that pre-Mapp case law should be reconsidered in the light of subsequent
developments,108 or even that that case law had been overruled sub silen-
tio by later decisions. 109 The majority's heavy reliance on Valentin, how-
ever, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship
between state and federal law. Valentin involved an appeal from an un-
successful motion to suppress evidence that had allegedly been seized ille-
gally. Because New Jersey did not have an exclusionary rule, the
prosecuting attorney had submitted no evidence to demonstrate that the
search had been reasonable. Before disposition of the appeal, however,
Mapp established that state courts were required to suppress evidence
seized in violation of federal constitutional norms. Thus, the court in
Valentin remanded the case for development of a record on the issue of
the legality of the seizure. 110
Admittedly, Valentin made passing reference to the fact that the de-
fendant had raised both state and federal claims.11' Further, the court
noted that in devising new procedures it should consider "the provisions
of the constitutions of both sovereignties." 2 The mandate of the court,
however, directed only that "both parties [should be permitted] to intro-
duce all relevant proof on the new issue generated by Mapp."' 11 Thus,
the Valentin decision did not imbed the exclusionary rule in New Jersey
state constitutional law; it simply purported to apply the rule of federal
law established in Mapp. Yet, by its nature, that rule requires exclusion
only of evidence obtained in violation of the federal Constitution; the
Supreme Court is powerless to mandate that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies to state constitutional claims. By simply assuming that, as a matter
104. Id. at 154, 519 A.2d at 854.
105. Id. at 148 n.30, 519 A.2d at 851 n.30.
106. 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737 (1961).
107. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 147, 519 A.2d at 851.
108. See id. at 148-59, 519 A.2d at 851-57.
109. In this regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court might have relied on State v. Hunt, 91
N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982). See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
110. Valentin, 36 N.J. at 43-44, 174 A.2d at 738.
111. Id. at 42-43, 174 A.2d at 737.
112. Id. at 44, 174 A.2d at 738.
113. Id.
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of state law, Mapp and Valentin automatically overruled previous state
court rejections of the exclusionary rule, the court in Novembrino acted
inconsistently with basic premises of state autonomy and federalism.
In short, the concept of federalism suggests the existence of con-
straints on courts that adopt either the pure independent or reac-
tive/independent approach to state constitutional adjudication. These
constraints are, however, relatively minor. The only necessity is that
state courts consult their own law rather than mindlessly adopting fed-
eral constitutional standards as a floor for state constitutional analysis.
Once this requirement is satisfied, considerations of state autonomy are
simply irrelevant to the ultimate result.
Conclusion-Justice Brennan and State Constitutional Theory
Justice Brennan fails in his attempt to demonstrate that state court
activism enhances the autonomy of the states in the American system.
While principles of state autonomy allow state courts to be more activist
than their federal counterparts, nothing in the federal structure suggests
that state courts should exercise this power. Indeed, the theory of feder-
alism requires that state courts reexamine the premises on which some
activist decisions have been based. Thus, Justice Brennan's argument not
only fails to justify state court activism, but also distorts state constitu-
tional analysis generally.

